Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent
Journal.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with
propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be
usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn
from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government,
there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into
several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to
be provided for--and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive
with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire
separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project
too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates. The ideas
of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned
toward three confederacies--one consisting of the four Northern, another of the
four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is little
probability that there would be a greater number. According to this
distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger
than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will suppose
that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government
less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been
proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain
magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same forms of
administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea
admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we can
measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government of any given
number of individuals; but when we consider that the island of Britain, nearly
commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight
millions of people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required
to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see
no reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient to
perform the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly
organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great
extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire
by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.
The supposition that each confederacy into which the States
would be likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive
than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more
probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the
alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical and
commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the
different States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they
will most naturally league themselves under two governments. The four Eastern
States, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy and
connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she
is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to
the weight of that confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that would
facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to think of
being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor do
there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania
would have strong inducements to join the Northern league. An active foreign
commerce, on the basis of her own navigation, is her true policy, and coincides
with the opinions and dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States,
from various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the
encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give
unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of
their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a
connection so adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a frontier,
she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned
towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger
power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to
avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the determination of
Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no
likelihood of more than one confederacy to the south of that State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States
will be able to support a national government better than one half, or one
third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great
weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on
the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to take a
nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil
lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed
to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies against
illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities
of revenue; and if we also take into view the military establishments which it
has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of
the several nations into which the States would be divided, we shall clearly
discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy, than to
the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part.
PUBLIUS.
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